Conversations > Trilateral Dynamics

For almost a decade, and especially during the five years since the conclusion of the 2015 DoP, Ethiopia has adopted a policy of obstructionism and prevarication that has undermined the negotiating process and that has sought to establish a fait accompli.

Ethiopia’s overall objective was, and remains, the exercise of unfettered control over the Blue Nile, including by filling and operating the GERD without taking the interests of downstream countries into consideration, and by securing an unrestrained right to undertake future projects upstream of the GERD, even if to the detriment of downstream riparian rights and Interests.

It was agreed that the TNC would appoint an international consultant to undertake these studies. During this period, the TNC held four meetings that failed to achieve any notable progress. It did not succeed in appointing an international consultant due to Ethiopian obstructionism on procedural issues such as the short-listing of the international consultants and the timeline for the conclusion of the studies recommended by the IPoE.

During the last meeting held in Washington DC from 12–13 February 2020, the observers proposed to formulate the “legal text on guidelines and rules on the first filling and annual operation of the GERD.” Ethiopia declined the offer on both procedural and substantive grounds and officially communicated the same to the observers.

Egypt deliberately consolidated all the lopsided proposals that had been rejected at different levels in the negotiations. Among several other objectionable details, it contained rules maintaining natural flow (foreclosing any existing and future development upstream of the GERD), guaranteed release (despite hydrological variability), maintaining HAD at 165 meters above sea level (while Ethiopia has no control over factors that determine HAD level), and opening an office at the GERD for joint management (infringement of Ethiopia’s sovereignty). Egypt then embarked on extensive diplomatic and other campaigns to pressure Ethiopia to accept its submission. Despite Egypt’s efforts to curtail the process, the three countries had to return to the NISRG mechanisms. This disruptive action wasted the invaluable time for the negotiation.

Egypt’s stubborn approach of “agreement on all or no agreement” prevented the NISRG from analyzing issues and developing scenarios for the first filling and annual operation of the dam.

Therefore, Sudan has always believed in and advocated regional cooperation and partnership over the Blue Nile, as well as the Nile River as a whole. This is demonstrated by Sudan’s positions and actions since its independence as a leader in all regional initiatives and programmes around the Blue Nile and the Nile River as a whole.

Sudan is currently leading an initiative to convince Egypt and Ethiopia to resume negotiations to reach a final and fair deal before starting the filling of the dam.

Ethiopia's incessant inclusion of the CFA in conversations on the GERD demonstrates its desire to impose a fait accompli on its downstream co-riparian states that have not acceded to this divisive agreement that, even after ten years since it was opened for signature, has not entered into force.

Ethiopia's equivocation an implacable posture also led to the failure of the latest round of negotiations that were held upon the initiative of the Republic of the Sudan and which lasted for several weeks. While Egypt reengaged in these talks to, once again, demonstrate its genuine commitmment to reach an agreement on the GERD, Ethiopia adopted a legally unpalatable and technically unconstuctive attitude throughout these negotiations. It refused to conclude an agreement that would be binding under international law, and proposed to adopt guidelines and rules the content of which it would be entitled to adjust at its discretion.

Contrary to the assertions included in the letter directed to Your Excellency by H.E. the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on May 14, 2020, the failure of negotiations on the GERD is due to Ethiopia's persistent policy of obstructionism and prevarication.

But we are not surprised at all, for it has been apparent for some time that Egypt had no intention of contributing to the sucess of the trilateral process. It has instead prioritized taking the matter to the Security Council - bypassing all regional mechanisms - with the view to internationalizing the GERD negotiations.

We believe the three parties made significant progress on the main technical issues, mainly the first filling, annual operation, mitigation measures, dam safety, environmental and social issues, coordination mechanism, and data exchange. However, on the legal matters a widening gap emerged on the issues of the binding nature of the legal arrangement including amendments and termination. The gaps on the legal matters also include dispute resolution mechanism, and the reference to 1959 water treaty between Egypt and Sudan as well as a demand by Ethiopia to enter into a water sharing agreement within 10 years in accordance with Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement.

Any other understanding or interpretation of this commitment would reflect the lack of political will to reach an agreement on GERD and reveal an underlying intention to impose an unacceptable fait accompli on downstream States and enforce the unilateral will of an upstream State on its co-riparians, and turn any talks into an exercise in futility.

Concurrently, however, we are unwaveringly committed to support our fellow African nations, especially in the Nile Basin and including Ethiopia, in their efforts to realize greater prosperity. This is evident in the fact that Egypt has cooperated with every Nile Basin State in constructing dams, in rain harvesting projects, in digging water wells and in the removal of waterweeds that constrict the flow of the river. This reflects our unshakable belief in our common destiny as Africans and confirms our conviction that the Nile River is not the exclusive property of Egypt or of any riparian State, but the common heritage and sacred trust of all our peoples.

It is unfortunate that Egypt and the Sudan rejected this goodwill gesture by Ethiopia and continue insisting on their unreasonable demand that the second-year filling of the dam should not proceed without “a comprehensive agreement” forecloses Ethiopia’s water use. It should be clear that this argument does not have any legal basis but, most importantly, it contravenes Ethiopia’s inherent right to utilize its natural resources based on the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and causing no significant harm. If the two countries want the second-year filling not to proceed without an agreement, then the best way forward is to agree to the compromise proposal by Ethiopia on the filling and related operation of the dam and to continue the negotiation to eventually reach a comprehensive agreement.

It is regrettable that I find it necessary to, once again, inform the Security Council that negotiations on the GERD are at an impasse and that Ethiopia remains intent on imposing a fait accompli on Egypt and the Sudan by continuing to impound the waters of the Blue Nile to fill the GERD reservoir. The failure of negotiations on the GERD, the unilateral filling and operation of this dam, and its potential adverse effects on downstream States and communities could precipitate a situation that threatens peace, security and stability throughout the Nile basin and the Horn of Africa.

The responsibility for the failure of the African Union-led process lays squarely with Ethiopia. Throughout the previous year, Ethiopia undermined the African Union-led negotiations by adopting substantively intransigent positions and a procedurally unconstructive attitude.

The negotiations on the GERD have, thus far, failed, not owing to disagreements on technical matters or questions of dam engineering, but because the issue is ultimately political. Throughout a decade of negotiations, Ethiopia has neither shown nor exercised the requisite political will to conclude an agreement on the GERD that is fair, balanced and mutually beneficial.

The AU-led process, as demonstrated in the AU Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of States Communique of June 26, 2020, was predicated on the good faith of Sudan, Egypt and Ehtiopia to build on the 90 percent of issues already agreed upon in previous rounds, and resolve the outstanding legal and technical matters. However, Ethiopia has refused repeatedly to engage with the AU Bureau's chosen "augmented committee" negotiation method, which stipulated an active role for observers and AU-appointed independent experts to support the three Parties in reaching a comprehense agreement.

Ethiopia has sought to introduce new negotiating positions and concepts such as time-bound “partial agreement” on filling and operation in order to link any comprehensive agreement to a concomitant “water allocation” agreement .

In all the meetings held in Khartoum, on November 4-5, 2013, December 8-9, 2013 and 4-5 January 2014, Egypt thwarted progress by tabling unrelated agenda. Thus, the meetings ended with no concrete agreement and the process was stalled for six months. Egypt stonewalled the process.

Egypt yet again delayed the process by over two years by blocking transmission of the comments of the three countries to the consultant. This - and preceding delays caused by Egypt- disabled the TNC from carrying out its functions. In effect, the countries were prevented from conducting the joint studies.

Egypt curtailed establishment of the NISRG by refusing to table to proposal in the agenda of the Nine Party meeting (Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Water Affairs and Chiefs of the Intelligence) held on 05 April 2018.

Entertaining downstream notions that wrongly perceive water issues as a security issue in contradiction with the notion of equity and reasonableness may make the UNSC privy to Egypt and Sudan’s historical design for total control of the Nile through the 1959 treaty and sets precedence impinging on the entitlement of upstream states of the Nile in their respective territories.

Disguised in the annual operation of the GERD, Egypt wants to uphold the status quo and maintain the 1959 partial water allocation to the detriment of Ethiopia. To this end, Egypt introduced triple layered thresholds in the name of drought, prolonged drought and prolonged dry years that will keep the GERD on a perpetual state of release.

The Republic of South Africa, during its chairmanship of the African Union, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, since the assumption of its chairmanship in February 2021, have been discharging their role to facilitate the trilateral talks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Unfortunately, since its commencement, Egypt and the Sudan have disrupted the African Union-led negotiation nine times, each time blocking a productive discussion.negotiation nine times, each time blocking a productive discussion.

Article 10 of the DoP provides the agreement of the parties to resolve differences in a peaceful manner. It enshrines three alternatives that may be invoked by the three countries. These are, mediation, conciliation or referral to heads of states. Neither Egypt nor Sudan invoked this provision to channel the process from negotiation to a phase of dispute resolution.

Egypt prevented the NISRG from analyzing issues and developing scenarios. The Group was even unable to compile and submit the report of its work to the water affairs ministers. In the process, the NISRG adopted by agreement the stage based first filling schedule that is currently a common element of the negotiation documents of the three countries.

Egypt refused to sign the minutes of the second meeting in Cairo on 2-3 December 2019. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Water Affairs met again on December 9, 2019 and January 15 at the office of the US Treasury Secretary. Further, two meetings were held in Washington, DC on 28-31 January 2020 and 12-13 February 2020. 12-13 February 2020, the observers proposed to formulate the “legal text on guidelines and rules on the first filling and annual operation of the GERD.” Ethiopia declined the offer on both procedural and substantive grounds and officially communicated the same to the “observers.”Despite Ethiopia’s request to postpone a meeting that was scheduled for 27-28 February 2020, consultations were held with Egypt and the Sudan in the absence of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has learned that Egypt has initialed a document prepared by the “observers”.

Reference Sudan made to Article 35 of the UN Charter is unwarranted. Ethiopia strongly believes that the GERD is a pillar for cooperation. It doesn’t pose threat to the peace and security of the countries in the region. The GERD, is a hydro-electric dam, that represents the most minimal aspect of Ethiopia’s legitimate exercise of its rights as a riparian state and source of eighty six percent of the waters of the Nile. By no stretch can a hydroelectric dam or a technical difference on the utilization of a transboundary river warrant the involvement of the UNSC. The negotiation pertaining to the first filling and annual operation of the GERD is one of many and continuing global water issues the resolution of which is the exclusive domain of the riparian states.

The current water affairs minister of Sudan made a presentation in 2015 based on the detailed study he conducted on benefits of the GERD to Sudan. The following are excerpts from his presentation on the main benefits that will accrue to Sudan upon the completion of the GERD. Although these details are rooted in the intents of Sudan and do not create any assumption of duty on the part of Ethiopia, it gives an accurate portrayal on the inconsistent claims by the Sudan.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam benefits the Sudan more than any other riparian country. To borrow the statement of Sudanese officials, the dam is for the Sudan what the High Aswan Dam is for Egypt. Regulated flow of the Nile will allow the Sudan to produce more food and generate more electricity. It will also save the lives and property that the Sudan keeps losing to excessive and perennial flooding. Cognizant of the benefits the Sudan will acquire, the people and governments of the Sudan have supported the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project from its inception. More recently, the Sudan has changed course for reasons known only to them. In this regard, it is worth noting that Egypt and the Sudan, per the 1959 agreement, are under obligation to advance a common position.

We encourage them to assuage their entrenched positions and continue with the trilateral negotiations in good faith in order to reach an amicable, equitable and reasonable agreement. Such agreements between riparian States become even more critical as climate change increases both flooding and drought in the river, as highlighted earlier by the UNEP Executive Director, Ms. Inger Andersen.